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 11  Republicanism and Markets 
 Robert S.  Taylor 
 The republican tradition has long been ambivalent about markets and 
commercial society more generally. Consider, for instance, the near- 
contemporary republican authors Jean- Jacques Rousseau and Adam 
Smith. Rousseau wrote approvingly of the ancient Romans’ “contempt 
for commerce” and condemned “pecuniary interest” as “the worst of all 
[interests], the vilest, the most liable to corruption” (Rousseau  1997b , 
131, 226). His hostility to a monetized economy with its complex div-
ision of labor even extended to tax payments as a substitute for  corv é es :
 It is the hustle and bustle of commerce and the arts, it is the avid interest in gain, 
it is softness and love of comforts that change personal services [to the state] into 
money. One gives up a portion of one’s profi t in order to increase it at leisure. 
Give money, and soon you will have chains. The word  fi nance is a slave’s word ... 
In a truly free State the citizens will do everything with their hands and nothing 
with money: Far from paying to be exempted from their duties, they would pay 
to fulfi ll it themselves. 
 (Rousseau  1997b , 113) 
 Smith, by contrast, found nothing troubling in the fact that “it is not from 
the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest ... As it is by treaty, 
by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one another the greater 
part of those mutual good offi ces which we stand in need of, so it is this 
same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division 
of labor” (Smith  1981 , 26– 27 [I.ii.2– 3]). Far from viewing the “hustle 
and bustle of commerce” as slavery’s prelude, he saw competitive markets 
as a source of liberation from feudal dependence; the modern “tradesman 
or artifi cer,” he pointed out, “derives his subsistence from the employ-
ment, not of one, but of a hundred or a thousand different customers. 
Though in some measure obliged to them all, therefore, he is not abso-
lutely dependent upon any one of them” (Smith  1981 , 420 [III.iv.12]). 
Whereas Rousseau saw the market order as a deadly threat to republican 
values, Smith viewed it as an essential tool for their realization. 
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 This ambivalence persists in present- day republicanism, with 
Rousseau’s position staked out by Michael Sandel, among others, and 
Smith’s position by Philip Pettit. Sandel’s pronounced suspicion of eco-
nomic exchange and commercial society more widely can be seen in his 
hostility to consumerism – he says admiringly of the republican trad-
ition that in it, “consumption, when it fi gured at all, was a thing to be 
moderated, disciplined, or restrained for the sake of higher ends. An 
excess of consumption, or luxury, was seen as a form of corruption, a 
measure of the loss of civic virtue” ( 1996 , 224– 225). This worry nat-
urally leads to his more recent “corruption objection” to markets: “we 
corrupt a good, an activity, or a social practice whenever we treat it 
according to a lower norm than is appropriate to it” ( 2012 , 46, 110). He 
raises this objection in a dizzying array of settings, ranging from surro-
gacy markets to programs that incentivize childhood reading and obesity 
reduction ( 2012 , 59, 61, 71). Sandel’s solution to these evils of market 
corruption is to “block exchanges,” i.e., use state regulations to prohibit 
certain sorts of trade. 
 Pettit’s attitude towards markets and commerce is, by contrast, much 
warmer. He seconds Smith’s belief that “far from threatening republican 
freedom, the market can reduce dependency and domination” (Pettit 
 2006 , 142). This can be true even in those contractual relations, like the 
ones between employers and employees, where the threat of domination 
is especially worrisome: as Pettit points out, “in a well- functioning labor 
market … no one would depend on any particular master and so no one 
would be at the mercy of a master: he or she could move on to employ-
ment elsewhere in the event of suffering arbitrary interference” ( ibid .) As 
he recognizes, however, for this to be the case the markets in question 
must be genuinely competitive:
 short of great differences in bargaining power, [a free market] does not mean that 
anyone is exposed to the possibility of arbitrary interference by any other or any 
group of others. One seller may be able to interfere with another by undercutting 
the other’s price, but the second should be free, above the level of the competi-
tive price, to undercut that price in turn; thus there is no question of permanent 
exposure to interference. 
 (Pettit  1997 , 205) 
 Again, this echoes Smith’s hostility, not to markets  per se , but rather to 
monopoly privileges that expose some (employees, consumers) to the 
arbitrary power of others (employers, producers). 
 Rather than offer a systematic historical survey of this republican 
ambivalence towards markets, I will instead focus here on the leading neo- 
republican theory – that of Philip Pettit – and explore its myriad implications 
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for market society, because these have signifi cant repercussions for the 
topic of this book,  viz. , the relationship between republicanism and dem-
ocracy. As I shall argue, Pettit’s theory is even friendlier to markets than 
most have believed; far from condemning commercial society in the spirit 
of a Rousseau or a Sandel, his theory recognizes that competitive markets 
and their institutional preconditions are alternative means to limit arbi-
trary power across the domestic, economic, and even political spheres. 
While most republican theorists have fi xated on political means to limit 
such power  – including both constitutional means (e.g., the separation 
of powers, rule of law, judicial review, federalism) and participatory ones 
(democratic elections and oversight) – I will recover an economic model 
of republicanism from Pettit’s theory that can complement, substitute for, 
and at times displace the standard political model. Whether we look at 
spousal markets, labor markets, or residential markets within a federal 
system, state policies that spur competition among their many participants 
and resource exit from abusive relationships within them can advance 
freedom as nondomination as effectively or even more effectively than 
social- democratic approaches that have recently gained enthusiasts among 
neo- republicans. These conclusions suggest that democracy, be it social 
or strictly political, is merely one means among others for restricting arbi-
trary power and is thus less central to (certain versions of) republicanism 
than we might expect. So long as they counteract domination, economic 
inroads into notionally democratic territory are no more concerning than 
constitutional ones. 
 1  Family 
 Asymmetrical, gender- based power relations within households make 
wives vulnerable to abuse by their husbands. Although domination 
of wives by husbands has been sharply curtailed over the last several 
decades by legal and social reform, it has hardly been abolished. Violence, 
as well as the threat of it, remain an important mechanism of control over 
married women. Also, residual labor- market discrimination and the still- 
gendered household division of labor suggest that both at work and at 
home, men collectively retain certain historical privileges and powers. 
Such inequalities put women at a disadvantage in entering, negotiating, 
and exiting marriages, and to the extent that this is true, wives are still 
vulnerable to domination and exploitation by their husbands. Marital 
power remains a pressing social problem, in short, and we must seek 
solutions to it if we hope to advance marital freedom. 
 The principal means of defense against such domination and exploit-
ation is still marital exit. As Pettit, abridging Milton, tells us, “marriage 
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could be free only if divorce was possible: that is, only if there was a pos-
sibility of release from the marriage bond – and from subjection to the 
rights and powers of a spouse – in the event of estrangement between the 
two parties” (Pettit  2012a , 158). If a husband knows that his wife can 
exit the marriage, he is much more likely to listen to her complaints and 
modify his behavior – but if so, that makes her voice more effective and 
thus more likely to be put to use. The shift to no- fault divorce throughout 
the West in the 1960s and 1970s amplifi ed women’s voices by giving 
them a right to end their marriages unilaterally by simply leaving their 
husbands and living separately for a minimum specifi ed period; they 
were no longer required to prove marital misconduct, such as adultery 
or cruelty, to receive a divorce. This abandonment of moralistic divorce 
policies and the simultaneous transfer of divorce powers from church 
and state to spouses themselves helped to liberate married women, who 
now had the ability to either exit unhappy marriages or credibly threaten 
to do so, thereby strengthening their own voices within marriage as well 
as promoting overdue changes in marital culture. 
 Even if no- fault divorce is, as I have argued, the most important means 
to counter marital power, it is far from being a suffi cient means, and 
it might in some situations  increase women’s vulnerability, which may 
explain some of the feminist opposition to it. If the right to marital exit 
is merely formal and can be unilaterally exercised by either spouse, then 
it may redound at times to the benefi t of abusive husbands, who could 
threaten to leave their dependent wives in penury at a moment’s notice, 
thereby gaining enormous bargaining power within their marriages. 
There is some evidence, in fact, that stay- at- home mothers were espe-
cially disadvantaged by the shift to no- fault divorce. The problem we 
face here is non- monotonicity in the relationship between exit costs 
and the welfare of the least advantaged; the welfare of dependent wives 
might at fi rst decrease, and only later increase, as exit costs fall, i.e., the 
move from an effectively no- exit world to a partial- exit one may hurt 
dependent wives, even if a further move to a free- exit world would aid 
them. The solution is to shift from a merely formal right of exit to a sub-
stantive one, which empowers the voices even of dependent wives. In 
order to accomplish this, we must not only  promote competition in both 
labor and dating/ marital markets but also  resource marital exit via various 
government services and income transfers. 
 Consider fi rst how stoking competition in various kinds of markets 
would lower marital exit costs. As I mentioned earlier on, gender dis-
crimination in labor markets can trap women in abusive marriages. Great 
progress has been made on this front, but there is much left to do. For 
example, recent structural changes in some professionals’ work (e.g., 
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pharmacists, veterinarians, pediatricians) towards increasing fl exibility 
and greater linearity of earnings with respect to time worked have dis-
proportionately benefi ted women and helped close the wage gap. These 
changes have been driven in part by economies of scale and pressures to 
reduce labor costs, but they have also occurred due to employee pressure 
(Goldin  2014 , 1116– 1118). This evolution of the workplace could be 
catalyzed by steering government contracts to fi rms with more fl exible 
work schedules, for example. Doing so would further diminish the wage 
gap and therefore improve the prospects of currently dependent wives 
who are considering marital exit. 
 Enhancing competition in dating and marital markets themselves may 
be as important, if not more so, than enhancing it in labor markets, espe-
cially for dependent wives with little work experience. Consider the case 
of women within insular ethnic and religious minorities who have been 
socialized from an early age to marry within their communities, who 
face internal marriage “markets” that are rigged against them, and who 
may be subject to emotional and even physical coercion when choosing 
marriage partners. Multiculturalism may be bad for women, especially 
if it means insulating such groups from liberal- rights enforcement and 
public education. On the other hand, efforts to open up such internal 
marital markets may fall afoul of important associational rights guaran-
teed to all citizens, rights that may help to protect minority groups and 
their members from other forms of domination (e.g., domination by the 
majority or by other, more powerful minorities). Fortunately, there are 
available policies that not only respect such equal associational rights 
but also safeguard “minorities within minorities.” For example, reason-
able requirements for civic education during childhood can inform these 
women of their rights and make them aware of the existence of, and the 
opportunities in, the larger society; additionally, the kinds of government 
services and income transfers discussed below can limit coercion and 
offer means of escape. The challenges that insularity and gender trad-
itionalism pose for such dependent women have decreased over time 
thanks to better education and law enforcement and to the tools made 
available by the internet (including dating sites), but more can be done to 
provide these women a broader array of options, marital and otherwise. 
 In addition to advancing market competition, states can resource exit 
by delivering both essential services and income transfers. First, given 
the ongoing problem of partner violence, it is essential that the gov-
ernment protect women from physical coercion, whether through the 
use of restraining orders and police protection or by fi nancing women’s 
shelters; without these services, exit may be too dangerous for them 
(Pettit  2012a , 115). Second, in the aftermath of divorce, states must 
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ensure a fair division of property and future income by enforcing ali-
mony and child- support payments and by instituting “community- 
property” rules (including the 50/ 50 division required by California law); 
both would help protect the fi nancial interests of stay- at- home wives who 
by forgoing employment limit their labor- market options and put them-
selves at a bargaining disadvantage vis- à - vis their working spouses. Third, 
states could offer vouchers specifi cally designed to enhance exit options, 
whether indirectly (e.g., ones for job retraining or vocational education 
more generally) or directly (e.g., ones for travel and/ or relocation, which 
would have the side benefi t of sustaining market and political freedoms, 
too, as we shall soon see). Finally, states could guarantee conditional 
or unconditional basic incomes to allow dependent women with min-
imal job market experience to support themselves, at least for a while, 
without working (Pettit  2007a ). All of these measures, both resource- 
and competition- related, can operate together to make marital exit a 
feasible option for dependent wives. Without them, the liberating poten-
tial of no- fault divorce will remain underdeveloped for the most vulner-
able class of married women. 
 However, I  should concede the diffi culty, perhaps even the infeasi-
bility, of extending this approach to household dependents, including 
minor children as well as elderly parents. Children will generally lack 
the rational agency that is needed to exercise exit responsibly, though 
as they approach majority they may be able to exit via emancipation 
by the courts; in their earlier years, exit will be possible only through a 
transfer of custody, whether initiated by the parents or state authorities. 
As a result, they will have to rely upon the moral constraints governing 
their parents’ behavior and the legal interventions of the state  in extremis 
(e.g., in cases of neglect or violence) to escape the arbitrary exercise of 
parental authority. For dependent elderly parents, the situation is far 
more complex. If they are mentally incompetent, their condition may 
resemble that of minor children. If they are mentally competent, on the 
other hand, exit may be a real option, especially when alternatives are 
abundant (e.g., other relatives, elder- care facilities) and exit is fi nancially 
viable due to private savings or state aid; again, effective competition and 
resourced exit are key here. When these conditions are absent, though, 
direct empowerment may be required, whether in the form of the regula-
tion option (monitoring and supervision by relevant state authorities) or 
the participation option (e.g., enforcing the rights of the elderly to have 
some say in particular aspects of their care). Whether marital freedom 
can become a model for familial freedom more broadly, then, is doubtful; 
protecting household dependents from domination will frequently 
require direct empowerment of voice in one form or another. 
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 As I will argue in the following sections, however, marital freedom  can 
serve as a model in many other contexts. Whether we consider the dom-
ination of workers by abusive managers or that of businesses by corrupt 
regulators and politicians, the kinds of policy instruments that were used 
to limit marital power through resourced exit and enhanced competition 
can also be used to limit market and political power. Marital freedom, 
in short, can act as a template for both market and political freedoms – 
and by doing so, it can offer a fresh approach to combating domination, 
one that is less dependent on social- democratic interventions than on 
empowered choice and free mobility in labor and locational markets. As 
we shall see, John Milton’s divorcive conception of freedom, seconded by 
Pettit, promises us liberation beyond the domestic sphere. 
 2  Economy 
 Asymmetrical, class- based power relations within fi rms can make workers 
vulnerable to abuse by owners and managers. Domination and exploit-
ation are especially likely when the labor market is monopsonistic or oli-
gopsonistic, i.e., one fi rm or a small group of fi rms has suffi cient market 
power to drive wages below the competitive level and otherwise ill- treat 
their employees. This phenomenon has not gone unnoticed by neo- 
republicans. Pettit, for example, in the midst of selling republicanism’s 
virtues to socialists, describes Marx’s belief that workers are
 wage slaves … dependent on the grace and mercy of their employer … [and] 
exposed to the possibility of arbitrary interference … If the employers in any area 
are collectively capable of blacklisting someone who displeases them, as many 
nineteenth- century employers certainly were, and if unemployment effectively 
means destitution, then it is clear why socialists should have thought that workers 
were nothing more than wage slaves 
 (Pettit  1997 , 141; cf.  2006 , 142;  2007a , 5). 
 Therefore, if an area’s employers act as a collective monopsonist, i.e., a 
labor- purchasing cartel, they can dominate their wage- slave employees, 
just as Marx claims, and so deprive them of their republican freedom. 
 Given these worrisome features of collusive labor markets, what public 
policies will best open them up? First, we should note that many existing 
public policies undermine competition in labor markets; thus, promo-
tion of competition will require us to abolish or reform these policies. 
For example, closed- shop unionism and related “for cause” dismissal 
clauses in labor contracts create market power for  workers , making it 
harder for employers to hire and replace workers at competitive wages 
and exposing them to union abuse. To quote Pettit, “think of the case 
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of small entrepreneurs … held to ransom by the primary or secondary 
picketing of a powerful trade union that can put them out of business” 
(Pettit  2014 , 91). A  move to right- to- work laws and universal at- will 
employment might restrain these labor- market abuses. Also, though 
private- sector union power has waned substantially since World War II, it 
has been replaced by an equally anti- competitive proliferation of occupa-
tional licensing rules; in the 1950s, a mere 5 percent of workers required 
state licenses, but now 35 percent do; by cartelizing professions ranging 
from hairdressing and cosmetology to horse massaging and bartending, 
licensing has made possible the exclusion of competitors, the exploit-
ation of consumers, and wage rates 18 percent higher  ceteris paribus than 
those in unlicensed professions (Kleiner and Krueger  2013 ). Shifting 
from licensing to a less exclusionary screening process (e.g., state certi-
fi cation) could retain most of the health and safety benefi ts of licensing 
without undermining labor- market competition. 
 Many existing public policies do enhance competition, of course. 
Antitrust actions make labor markets more competitive by boosting the 
number of rival employers or forcing incumbent employers to behave in 
a more competitive manner (by, say, breaking up cartel arrangements). 
Recent revelations that Google, Apple, Intel, and Adobe colluded in a 
scheme not to solicit one another’s employees are a case in point; the 
resulting class- action suit is leading to an antitrust settlement of hundreds 
of millions of dollars for the exploited engineers (Streitfeld  2014 ). Also, 
state agencies might educate employees about their contractual rights 
and collect and disseminate information about other job opportunities, 
be they local or national; ignorance can be a friction in its own right, 
leading workers to stay in employment relations they would be better off 
leaving. 
 More radically, the state might pursue redistributive policies to make 
it easier for workers to exit workplaces. Workers may have a tough time, 
for example, saving up the money necessary to move to another place 
in search of work – an especially pressing problem in impoverished and 
insular regions of the country like rural Appalachia. Governments could 
provide “relocation vouchers” to enable just such moves, tightening 
local labor markets and disciplining abusive employers in the process. 
The Trade Adjustment Assistance program already offers such help to 
displaced workers in the form of moving allowances and stipendiary 
support to take up a job in a new city; unemployment insurance could 
be changed to allow the long- term unemployed to take advances on their 
benefi ts for the purposes of a move (Moretti  2013 ). In a similar fashion, 
states could empower workers to seek alternative employment – including 
self- employment – by offering “capitalist” demogrants, i.e., seed money 
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to encourage the accumulation of physical, fi nancial, and human capital; 
these might come in the form of small- business awards, start- up cash for 
playing the stock market or buying an annuity to subsidize a low- paying 
but rewarding career (e.g., topiary gardening), educational vouchers, etc. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the state could provide a basic income, 
which would serve as a backstop against employment exploitation and 
domination by making it possible for workers to exit the labor market 
entirely (Pettit  2007a ). 
 Having said this, we must always be alert to a problem discussed 
above: non- monotonicity in the relationship between exit costs and the 
welfare of the least advantaged. If government does nothing but pro-
tect formal rights of movement and occupational choice, then abusive 
employers will prompt an exodus of their most advantaged employees, 
diminishing the voices of those they leave behind. To prevent this even-
tuality, states must transform partial- exit worlds into free- exit ones by 
embracing the full array of economic policies just surveyed; they must 
not only promote competition in labor markets but also resource exit via 
various government services and income transfers. Relatedly, we should 
be conscious of the fact that these policies are not  à la carte ; they must 
be implemented in tandem, because pursuing just a subset of them may 
increase rather than decrease domination. For example, a ruthless attack 
on union privilege without parallel efforts to limit employer collusion in 
some labor markets and enhance labor mobility may just make workers 
more vulnerable to the market power of capitalists. We must always bear 
in mind that deregulation and liberalization can be spurred as much by 
rent- seeking behavior as by regulation and protection. This fact is not 
an argument for maintaining anti- competitive practices but instead a 
reminder that as we approach these tasks we must keep a wary eye on 
what Jeremy Bentham called “sinister interests.” 
 Even if this exit- friendly policy package were implemented in full, how-
ever, it would not entirely solve the problem of market domination due 
to both natural and legal limits on economic agency. Market freedom 
presumes such agency; workers without it would lack the ability to hold 
their employers accountable and defend their own interests through voice 
or exit. In some cases, however, it will either be absent (e.g., the severely 
mentally disabled) or present only in a limited way (e.g., many of the 
elderly); exit will have to be supplanted by voice here, be it in the form 
of regulation or even social- democratic participation. More disturbingly, 
there are sometimes legal limits on economic agency that may call for voice 
as a second- best corrective. Consider the case of California farmworkers 
who are in the country illegally. It would be diffi cult to resource their exit 
from abusive employment relations because fear of deportation would 
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make them hesitant to apply for such state support in the fi rst place; 
moreover, because a small set of families has often owned farmland in 
any given area for a long period of time, collusion is not only likely but 
also hard to police due to codes of silence. As a consequence, the private- 
power option of the United Farm Workers union, while far from perfect, 
might be better than doing nothing. A much better solution, of course, 
would be to legalize these workers, aggressively pursue antitrust action 
against colluding farm employers, resource exit via travel and relocation 
vouchers, and so forth, but these actions may be politically infeasible. 
We therefore have to remain open to the direct empowerment of voice  in 
extremis , despite serious drawbacks (e.g., abuses by unions themselves). 
 Consistent with these qualifi cations, however, a republican eco-
nomic program should be primarily focused on promoting competitive 
conditions (including a plurality of informed buyers and sellers, free 
entry and exit, and price- taking rather than price- making behavior) and 
pursuing policy innovations that would help us attain these conditions, 
including informational campaigns, labor- market reform, antitrust, capit-
alist demogrants, and a basic income. These reforms and the competitive 
conditions they would support constitute an economic constitutionalism 
as important as the political sort with which republicans have tradition-
ally been identifi ed; perfect competition is a translation of the rule of law 
into the economic sphere. Once republicans take this lesson to heart, 
they will (like their commercial- republican forefather Adam Smith) look 
upon competitive markets with enthusiasm (Taylor  2013 ). 
 3  State 
 I argued in the last section that labor monopsony is market power in its 
most extreme and disturbing form. The totalitarian state is its analog with 
respect to political power. Such a state, in its “ideal” form, superintends 
a completely closed society lacking any democratic participation or insti-
tutional checks and balances on its one- man or one- party rule. North 
Korea is the closest contemporary approach to this ideal; Kim Jong- 
un’s control over his subjects is exactly the kind of power Pettit has in 
mind when he says that a capacity to interfere with impunity and at will, 
when it is “fully realized,” “amounts to an absolutely arbitrary power” 
(Pettit  1996 , 580). Arbitrary political power can be found in many other 
contexts, however, including liberal- democratic ones; think of racist cops 
who subject residents of inner- city communities to the daily humiliation 
of stop- and- frisks as a form of illicit racial profi ling, or corrupt offi cials 
with the discretion to grant or withhold essential permits who demand 
bribes from businessmen. 
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 Republicans have long been focused on the problem of arbitrary polit-
ical power and have explored a variety of solutions, most notably consti-
tutional ones that safeguard citizens by means of the dispersal of political 
power, such as the checks and balances associated with the separation of 
powers, bicameralism, international legalism, and especially federalism 
(Pettit  1997 , 177– 180). Earlier republican supporters of federalism, 
including Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Kant, viewed confederal inter-
state arrangements as a way to combine the virtues of small republics 
with those of large monarchies ( viz. , political nondomination and mili-
tary power, respectively) and secure international peace. The authors of 
 The Federalist Papers developed these ideas further, applying them to an 
interlocking federal arrangement among the American states. Hamilton, 
quoting Montesquieu in  Federalist 9, emphasized the way that dividing 
sovereignty between the states and federal government would protect 
citizens from domination by the authorities at either level; Madison 
echoes this thought in  Federalist 51: “the different governments will con-
trol each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself” 
(Hamilton, Madison, and Jay  2003 , 35– 40, 251– 255). 
 Contemporary republicans, however, have failed to notice that feder-
alism, in addition to providing participatory and constitutional checks 
on the exercise of arbitrary political power, offers a more market- 
oriented approach too, an economic model of political republicanism 
that harnesses both resourced exit and competitive markets in the service 
of nondomination. In this model, a mobile citizenry places political sub- 
units  – cities, counties, states, and provinces – into vigorous competi-
tion with each other for residents and businesses; far from a race to the 
bottom, this competition can, if properly regulated and resourced, con-
strain arbitrary power and force sub- units to track citizen preferences. 
In the limit, such competition can not only complement but even to 
some degree substitute for political voice, lessening our reliance on the 
vagaries of democratic control (Tiebout  1956 ). This economic model of 
political republicanism can never entirely displace the participatory and 
constitutional approaches, of course, especially as we ascend the hier-
archy of political sub- units and exit becomes increasingly costly in ways 
that cannot be fi nessed by constitutional, legal, and policy reforms. Still, 
even if exit cannot substitute for voice in the political realm to the degree 
that it can in the domestic and economic realms, its potential role in pro-
moting political freedom remains underappreciated by neo- republicans. 
 Such citizen mobility and jurisdictional competition have even 
promoted freedom for the most vulnerable members of our nation. 
Historical examples abound of disadvantaged minorities who have 
fl ed domination, exploitation, and discrimination in one part of the 
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country for a better life in another, in the process generating pressure for 
change both in their new homes and in the places they left behind. The 
most famous of these were the various phases of the Great Migration 
of African- Americans out of the South during the Jim Crow era. This 
exodus to the North, West, and more tolerant parts of the South not 
only enriched the cultures of these regions and catalyzed political change 
there but also forced especially intolerant Southern cities and states to 
modify their oppressive policies (e.g., by cracking down on lynching and 
improving property protections and educational opportunities) so as 
to retain their cheap supply of domestic and agricultural labor (Somin 
 2011 , 218). A similar, if less dramatic, process can be observed in the 
internal migration of gays and lesbians to more tolerant cities and states 
(Clark  2003 ). 
 What these examples indicate, however, is not just the promise of 
citizen mobility and the interjurisdictional competition it induces but 
also their limits, at least under historical conditions. The ongoing lib-
eration of African- Americans, gays, and lesbians from various forms 
of localized oppression, although certainly helped by foot voting, has 
mostly been driven by participatory and constitutional means (e.g., the 
various referenda, legislative votes, and court decisions to legalize gay 
marriage, often over local objections). These apparent limits of the eco-
nomic model are due not to intrinsic problems with it but rather to a 
failure to secure its preconditions,  viz. , resourced exit and robust com-
petition. The right to exit local jurisdictions remains formal, not sub-
stantive, and interjurisdictional competition has been suppressed by 
various characteristics of federal and state constitutions, laws, and pol-
icies. The tragic consequences of the failure to resource exit can be seen 
most clearly in educated blacks’ abandonment of the ghetto in the 1960s 
and the related contemporary controversy about police abuse in minority 
communities, ranging from the kind of profi ling cited earlier to racially 
motivated assault and even homicide. The African- Americans who 
remain trapped in these dysfunctional inner- city communities lack the 
resources to move on and, even if they had them, may be misinformed 
about opportunities elsewhere, whether in terms of better state services 
or better job prospects. In order for jurisdictional competition to play a 
constructive role in the lives of our least- advantaged citizens, more will 
have to be done to enable their exit from abusive – or simply neglectful – 
communities and to cause the leaders of these communities to anticipate 
the fi scal and economic pain of their departure. 
 Increasing mobility rates for the least advantaged is a daunting task, one 
that will have to proceed along a variety of different policy dimensions. One 
of the most important dimensions is informational: getting high- quality, 
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easy- to- digest data about employment opportunities, housing costs, and 
school quality in different metropolitan areas into the hands of the poor. 
Although the various government statistical bureaus will have to play 
a central role in this, such an effort will be for naught unless the poor 
can access the place where such information is most easily posted: the 
internet. The so- called “digital divide” places the poor at a great dis-
advantage in access to the internet. Bridging this divide might be done 
directly, through home- broadband subsidies, or indirectly, by improving 
internet access at public libraries. 
 Even if the poor were fully informed about such opportunities, though, 
various obstacles to moving remain in their way. One that has been 
mostly removed by the Affordable Care Act is the absence of health- 
insurance portability. Another is the risk of losing various kinds of wel-
fare support; unless these are portable too, the poor will be resistant 
to moving, especially when such moves will take them far away from 
the support networks of friends and family. Welfare reforms that gave 
the states greater discretion in designing programs, determining eligi-
bility, etc., have been fruitful in many ways, but the federal government 
still has a key role to play in coordinating these efforts so that mobility 
among recipients is not discouraged, perhaps by assuring a decent social 
minimum that is invariant across states. Another obstacle that will occur 
to anyone familiar with the nation’s successful metropolitan areas is 
housing costs; these are very desirable locations and have correspond-
ingly pricey rental markets. Rental vouchers for the poor are one way 
of dealing with this problem, but so are efforts to increase the supply of 
affordable housing in these places, whether by modifying zoning laws 
to allow denser growth or improving public transit so that the poor can 
commute more easily (Moretti  2013 , 176– 177). 
 The most direct and radical approach to improving the mobility of 
the poor – but also the most promising, I think – is relocation vouchers 
that cover some or all of the costs of an intercity move, including moving 
expenses proper (moving van, air fl ights, etc.), security deposits on 
new apartments, and so on. The federal Trade Adjustment Assistance 
program, which helps workers who have lost their jobs to foreign trade, 
already offers relocation assistance; such aid could and should be 
extended to the entire pool of disadvantaged workers (Moretti  2013 , 
163). The results of an experiment run in the 1990s suggest that reloca-
tion vouchers could offer signifi cant benefi ts for the uneducated and the 
poor. In the Move to Opportunity (MTO) program, randomly selected 
residents of public housing in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, 
and New York were offered mobility counseling and a housing voucher 
to move to a different, less impoverished part of the city. Five years later, 
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the experimental group had made substantial improvements over the 
control group in terms of both obesity reduction and mental health (dis-
tress, depression, anxiety, sleep, and calmness); unfortunately, adult eco-
nomic self- suffi ciency (earnings, welfare support) was unaffected (Kling, 
Liebman, and Katz  2007 ). One reason for this last result, however, is 
relatively easy to discern – MTO only enabled moves  within cities, but, as 
Moretti remarks, “today it is differences  across cities that are more likely 
to be the source of mismatch [between where the poor live and where 
the jobs are]” (Moretti  2013 , 163– 164). So my proposed relocation vou-
cher might best be restricted to intercity moves, as I originally suggested, 
in order to encourage resettlement in places with better job prospects, 
public services, etc. 
 As we have seen, increasing mobility among our least- advantaged citi-
zens is a promising way to reduce their vulnerability to arbitrary power 
and improve their welfare. Cities vary widely in the quality of their 
public services (especially their schools and policing) and job markets, so 
converting the poor’s merely formal right of geographic exit to a substan-
tive one offers them the same kinds of opportunities the more affl uent 
have to restart their lives in richer, safer, and more progressive places. 
But this only deals with the demand side of the problem, so to speak. In 
order for our economic model of political republicanism to reach its full 
potential, we must also make sure that cities face the proper incentives 
to supply the most attractive mixes of public services at the lowest pos-
sible prices (i.e., tax rates). In other words, we must do everything in 
our power to intensify jurisdictional competition for a newly mobile citi-
zenry; we can then reasonably hope to approach, if not reach, the ideal 
of a perfectly competitive locational marketplace, one that purges power 
from the political system and thereby establishes full political freedom, 
at least at the local level. 
 How might this interjurisdictional struggle be amplifi ed? The most 
effective way to do so is with  subsidiarity , i.e., “the principle that a cen-
tral authority should have a subsidiary function, performing only those 
tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more immediate or local 
level” (OED Online  2015 ). The form of subsidiarity that is most relevant 
in our context is  fi scal federalism , which decentralizes tax- and- spending 
decisions for local public goods to the relevant level of government (city, 
county, state, etc.), leaving the federal government to handle spillover 
effects across jurisdictions (by means of policy coordination, compensa-
tory taxes and subsidies, etc.), deliver truly national public goods (e.g., 
national defense), ensure macroeconomic stability, and engage in income 
redistribution in order to prevent “social dumping” (Oates  1999 , 1121– 
1122). As Oates explains, doing so will best promote social welfare:
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 By tailoring the outputs of [local public] goods and services to the particular 
preferences and circumstances of their constituencies, decentralized provision 
increases economic welfare above that which results from the more uniform levels of 
such services that are likely under national provision. The basic point here is simply 
that the effi cient level of output of a local public good … is likely to vary across 
jurisdictions as a result of both differences in preferences and cost differentials.
( ibid. ) 
 Because citizen sorting will make jurisdictions more homogeneous in 
terms of demand for local public goods, it will tend to increase the wel-
fare gains of fi scal decentralization (Oates  2006 , 40). For our purposes, 
though, the greatest advantage of fi scal federalism is its effect of putting 
every fi scal tub on its own bottom, i.e., forcing every local jurisdiction 
to pay for its own public goods. As a consequence of this, local gov-
ernment will have a robust incentive to attract and keep both residents 
and businesses, lest its tax base vanish and its public- goods mix become 
unaffordable. This induced competition for a mobile citizenry will con-
strain the ability of local governments to exploit, dominate, and discrim-
inate against their residents – even, in the limit, wholly eliminating it. 
Fiscal federalism, by offering supply- side incentives to complement our 
demand- side mobility resourcing, completes the economic model of pol-
itical republicanism. 
 As I noted earlier, though, this republican economic model can never 
entirely replace the political one. Even at the local level the political 
model has a role to play, and as we move up the federal hierarchy that role 
becomes increasingly prominent. Indeed, the very political framework 
that makes the economic model possible can only be established through 
the exercise of voice at the national level; for instance, the mobility 
vouchers I have relied upon to make my case have to be a product of 
both political entrepreneurship and coalition- building in national pol-
itics. I have promoted this economic model not in order to reduce pol-
itical freedom to market freedom but rather to show that, in order to 
minimize political domination, we must try to fi nd an optimal mix of 
accountability mechanisms, one that will vary by level of government 
and even across time but will rarely if ever be all voice or all exit. 
 At the same time, we should also not underestimate the value of a dis-
tinctively economic approach to the problems of domination. Consider 
again the mobility vouchers that have played such an outsized role in 
this section’s argument. These vouchers can do triple duty by restraining 
domination across the three spheres of family, market, and state; they can 
help wives escape their abusive husbands, workers fl ee their overbearing 
employers, and citizens exit their dysfunctional communities. Republican 
freedom demands that we minimize domination across the private and 
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public realms, and the pairing of markets and mobility can create syner-
gies over the whole range of human relations. More ambitiously, we can 
hope that in the years to come, the spread of open societies, advances in 
education, and reductions in transportation costs will make an applica-
tion of the economic model to global society possible. 
 Conclusion 
 If we have learned anything about the state over the past quarter- of- 
a- millennium, it is that constitutional democracy, whatever its fl aws, is 
more effective than any other political system at preventing the exercise 
of arbitrary power by public agents. Combining democratic participa-
tion, both formal and informal, with institutional checks and balances 
allows the people to hold their rulers to account but simultaneously 
restrains popular power, keeping both rulers and ruled from becoming 
tyrants. Given the success of this republican strategy in the political 
realm, it is wholly unsurprising that contemporary republicans would 
try to extend it to other realms too. Reasoning by analogy, they have 
endorsed both participatory and constitutional solutions to the problem 
of private power. Their analogy is a weak one, though; due to the rela-
tive ease of exiting family and fi rm, the domestic and economic realms 
are fundamentally unlike the political one  – and even in the political 
realm, exit is often feasible, and increasingly so as we approach the local 
level. This essential difference implies that the political model so beloved 
by neo- republicans is not a universal strategy for dealing with arbitrary 
power but rather a special strategy for a particular political context,  viz. , 
one in which the cost of exit is prohibitive. Insofar as a universal strategy 
even exists, it is the one suggested by a different analogy: that between 
the economic realm, on the one hand, and the domestic and political 
realms, on the other. Markets exist in all three – spousal markets, labor 
and product markets, residential markets, etc.  – and when the state 
intervenes to make them properly competitive and help their participants 
enter and exit them at will, it creates environments free of domination. 
 As we have seen, however, the economic model itself lacks universal 
applicability. At the level of national politics especially, where the eco-
nomic model’s policy frameworks of resourced exit and enhanced com-
petition must be created and maintained, there is simply no substitute for 
voice, for the tricky business of political entrepreneurship and coalition- 
building in a democratic system. What this suggests is that the economic 
model should be understood not as an unerring strategy for dealing 
with all problems of domestic, economic, and political domination, but 
rather as a strong default position across the three spheres. Of course, 
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this presumption of applicability is a defeasible one, as we just saw; given 
the high costs of international migration,  inter alia , the model is unlikely 
to have much relevance to a national state, and even at lower levels of 
the state exit costs will generally remain high enough to require some 
role for the political model. For the domestic and economic spheres, 
however, the political model should have no role to play, except in mar-
ginal cases (e.g., when rational agency is compromised by psychological 
or physical abuse or legal disabilities). Treating the economic model as 
a strong default will require neo- republicans to reorient their thinking 
about domination, obliging them to trade their social- democratic tastes 
for market- friendlier ones and take the danger of state domination more 
seriously. By supporting policies such as the basic income, they have 
already begun this transition; I hope this chapter will persuade them to 
continue it (Taylor  2017 ). 
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